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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Accounting Auditing & Financial 
Management at the International Hellenic University.   
This study designed to examine the factors affecting the level of external audit fees 
paid by financial institutions to their auditors in European Union. Studies have investi-
gated on market structures for audit services in economies of the USA, UK, Canada and 
Australia with the common characteristic of continuous exclusion of the financial sec-
tor.  This study, using measures that are unique and more applicable to banks, in order 
to fill this area. A standard audit fee model, modified accordingly, is used to investigate 
the specific effect of measures like bank size, risks and complexities on audit fees for 
136 banks. Multiple OLS regression was used as the estimation technique on the panel 
data collected through databases over a 6-year post consolidation periods covering 
2010-2015. Our model reports that the risks examined as important by the regulatory 
agencies are the same that audit ﬁrms consider too. In the future is expected that the 
concern of the audit process for banks is likely to enhance, following the general at-
tempt of   controlling banks' high risk activities. 
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Introduction 
Audit and assurance services generally considered an important element for 
the efficient operation of markets of capital.  Companies paid for the external audit 
services to their auditors and this transaction has interest to both companies and audi-
tors: legislation requires from companies’ n to have their financial statements audited 
with the need of reasonable fees, auditors provide such services and want to ensure 
that the fees are equivalent to the provided service (Gist, 1992). Besides companies 
and auditors, generally the shareholders and the public are concerned that the audit 
fee it is either too high or too low that may affect confidence in the audit opinion. Con-
sequently, the level of audit fees and the way that are determined are important is-
sues to professional accounting bodies to indicate the basis on which audit fees should 
be determined. In addition, these statements were also outlined to limit auditors from 
charging their fees in an unethical way associated with the audit profession. Thus, they 
attempt to enforce auditors’ objectivity, and effectiveness. 
Meanwhile, the banking sector is globally probably the most sensitive sector in an 
economy, as a single bank failure may trigger a domino, causing significant turbulence 
in the entire world with the recent example of Lehman's bankruptcy filing, considered 
the largest in US history, and have played a major role in the start of the late-2000s 
global financial crisis. In all economic systems, banks have the major role in planning 
and carry out financial policy. The difference is found in the type of goals and their way 
of achievement. Based on the socialistic system bank operations aim at improving the 
economy and satisfying the social needs, on the other hand neo-liberal model, aim to 
greater profits by using all means leading to the existing economic situation. 
   However, to date, most studies in auditing tend to omit from the analysis the 
banking sector. This is a gap because knowledge of determinants of audit fees should 
be of interest and importance to suppliers and users of the audit services as well as the 
regulators, because, this would assist the auditors to examine their cost structure, 
predicting future fees and measure audit efficiency Firth (1997). 
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  This study would contribute to literature because, it would add to scanty works on 
determinants of audits fees in the banking sector globally and would also give a vision 
to pricing of audit in financial industry from European Union. A standard audit fee 
model, adjusted appropriately, is used to investigate the specific effect of measures 
like bank size, risks and complexities on audit fees for 136 banks. Multiple OLS regres-
sion was used as the estimation technique on the panel data collected through data-
bases over a 6-year post consolidation periods covering 2010-2015. 
 We find that audit fees are a function of a vector of auditee – specific, auditor –
specific and bank specific characteristics. We also reveal that these influences are not 
always symmetrical across large and smaller banks. More specifically our results are 
aligned with the existed literature, revealing a positive relationship between fees and 
the client’s size and complexity, and Big 5 auditors. The risk undertaken by the auditor 
revealed to influence the values of fees in larger and smaller clients differently. In gen-
eral, there are proxies that affect both small and large banks at a similar level but fac-
tors like intangible assets, CAPRATIO and securities seem to work in a different way. 
This study would proceed as follows, in section two, the institutional and theoreti-
cal background, section three, the literature review, section four, the research meth-
odology of the study and the results of data analysis and in section five, concluding 
remarks are presented. 
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Institutional & Theoretical Background 
In this chapter is presented a brief recursion to the development of banking sector 
a recent market analysis and the institutional background with the key legislation pro-
visions for the audit procedure.  
Banking Sector 
Banking organizations hold almost the 7.1 trillion € of market capitalization in Eu-
ropean Union. Banks are a crucial component to the global economy activity in their 
role as depository institutions and lenders to both corporations and individuals, by 
drew savings and obtain credit, banks are the oil for the wheels that keep the economy 
turning.  The source of international banking is located 4.000 years ago, when cultures 
used letters of credit and bills of exchange provided across their boundaries to finance 
the first forms of trade. In 15th century the word “bank”, was used more recently, 
when bankers from Florence used desks to prepare their transactions. 
International banking is a significant component of the global economy as through 
capital flow it provides liquidity around the world. In 90s was the international banking 
system was dominated by large institutions of the most developed economies, the 
United States, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and Canada. In that period, Interna-
tional banks have proceeded to great changes to face the intensive competition from 
other financial institutions which led them into riskier fields. The early 2000s were 
characterized by consolidation of existing banks and entrance into the market from 
other financial institutions which open fields with higher risk. The main characteristic 
of 2000s was the association of existing banks and the entrance of other financial in-
struments into the market. Also, in the beginning of 21st century we faced the tech-
nical modernization of the banking system and the great move to internet banking. 
The banking system faced many changes in order to reach its’ current and known 
form.  Actions like, mergers, acquisitions, takeovers privatization, and other refor-
mations, that had happened in the past, led banks to form their profile. The Canadian 
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and German banking systems are considered the strongest and all over the world. Ca-
nadian banks have long been a byword for stability. Canada has had only two bank 
failures in almost 100 years, and those from regional banks, and had zero failures dur-
ing the Great Depression of the 1930s. The German banking system, is separated in 
three categories of banking activities and is characterized as a bank-based system. 
Commonly, the competition among the European banks is in extended level because of 
the privatization.  In addition, in order banking activities being controlled and inves-
tors' safety being ensured many financial regulations and supervision systems were 
established. The Late-2000s financial crisis caused significant stress on banks around 
the world. The collapse of significant banks resulted in government bail-outs. The col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 led to a general credit doubt and glob-
al banking crises. Bank institutions in all countries are considered machines of econom-
ic growth. Regardless of the economic relevance of the banks, the level of investigation 
is rather little on the relationship of banks and their auditors. 
The setting of this paper is compatible for several reasons. Firstly, according to 
Beaver (1996), the setting allows us to extend the general audit fee model into a very 
rich institutional context. Precisely, most audit and assurance fee studies (e.g., Simu-
nic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Defond et al., 2000; Copley and Douthett, 2002) exclude fi-
nancial institutions because banks belong to a special category. The fee model of this 
paper consists of certain measures that are unique to banks, by that offering a struc-
ture within bank audit pricing can be analyzed empirically.  This analysis is important 
for several parties of banking and accounting system. First, bank auditors, are subject 
to extensive regulatory scrutiny, so in the same frame audit fees are likely to be tied to 
regulatory risks, thus this paper could be useful to accounting firms as they need to 
evaluate their litigation exposure in this industry. Our investigation is not only interest-
ing to auditors but also to the respective regulatory authorities. Regulatory authorities, 
extensively rely on external auditors work in order to evaluate the financial condition 
of banks. Stated differently, if the audit activity fails would endanger both bank share-
holders and the public generally to avoidable risks. This paper focus on the above issue 
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straight by studying relationship between fees that banks pay and their primary regu-
latory risks. 
Finally, in the context of New Basel Capital Accord (issued in 31/05/2001), the need 
of transparency of banks’ financial condition that is directly tied with capital adequacy 
and market discipline, is increased, and the audit function plays a crucial role offering 
this transparency. Following the above arguments, it is very important that we tend to 
build up an insight to the performance and completeness of the bank audit process. 
Our analysis may be used for further research in the future. 
Market Analysis 
The European banks industry has declined marginally overall in recent years, at-
tributable mainly to noticeable declines in asset values in 2012 and 2013. It rebounded 
in 2014 and growth is forecast through to 2019. The European banks industry had total 
assets of $61,270.3bn in 2014, representing a mixed annual rate of change (CARC) of -
0.1% between 2010 and 2014. In comparison, the German and UK industries declined 
with compound annual rate of change (CARC)s of -1.5% and -2.9% respectively, over 
the same period, to reach respective values of $10,354.7bn and $11,533.5bn in 2014. 
A great majority of banks continue to battle with the impact of regulatory restrictions.  
Recently, a lot of banks have been charged with large fines for regulatory violations. 
HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, and UBS were part of a group of six banks fined a total 
of £2.6bn ($4.2bn) by UK and US regulators over their traders' attempted manipulation 
of foreign exchange rates. The bank credit department was the industry's most valua-
ble in 2014, with total assets of $29,449.3bn, corresponding to 48.1% of the industry's 
complete value. The trading assets sector had assets of $10,778.4bn in 2014, compa-
rable to 17.6% of the industry's accumulated value. 
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Table 1-Banking Industry Information 
 
Year $ billion % Growth 
2010 69,395 - 
2011 64,231 4,6% 
2012 63,208 (1,6%) 
2013 60,236 (4,7%) 
2014 61,735 1,7% 
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Institutional Setting 
The activities carried out by independent auditors are usually seen as extremely 
important for the operation of financial and capital markets as far as the role of audi-
tor’s concern to provide opinions on accounting information, which play fundamental 
role to the creation of greater trust and credibility business environments (Newman, 
Patterson, & Smith, 2005; Ojo, 2008). Auditors for that reason act as intermediaries for 
financial information. In addition to helping economic agents in more regulated sectors 
such as banking also provide help to the actions of oversight bodies. The argument be-
hind this notion is that the work of auditors completes the actions of supervisors, in 
order to help in building the concept of the financial system’s health and reliability. 
Given the uniqueness of the financial system, in which an institution's failure can 
create a chain reaction involving other banks and other economic parts, as shown in 
the 2008 global crisis, the reliability of accounting information is particularly im-
portant. The regulatory and supervisory bodies come to fulfill their role which is to 
protect the financial stability of the system. This role is emphasized, as external audi-
tors   are responsible for ratify to the credibility of accounting information. 
The Council of Ministers, on 14 April 2014, adopted audit legislation that has been 
discussed since October 2010. Other provisions included, the legislation enforce man-
datory audit firm rotation for the statutory auditors of all Public Interest 
European entities, are imposed serious constrains to the non-audit services that 
can be offered to them by their statutory auditors. The legislation focus on audits of 
companies with transferable securities of EU and certain organizations operating in the 
public interest, like banks and insurance companies. The law also concerns EU subsidi-
aries of companies located outside the EU. 
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Key provisions of the legislation 
 Auditor independence: The law announces obligatory firm rotation for the legal 
auditor of the company after the primary engagement period of 10 years, apart 
from joint audits. The legislation present significant new limitations on the non-
audit services a PIE can obtain from its auditor, like:  consultancy services, ser-
vices concerning the management or decision-making procedures of the PIE 
and, services connected to the financing, capital structure and investment 
strategy of the PIE. Certain of the new EU restrictions go beyond existing inter-
national rules under the IESBA Code. Member States can also forbid additional 
non-audit services with their domestic laws. 
 Auditor reporting and audit firm transparency: The law move further and im-
pose new guidelines to auditor’s report asking for the statement of the most 
important risks with a summary of the ways that the auditor would use to face 
them. In June 2013, the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) revised the audi-
tor reporting standard, that is related to audits of financial statements for peri-
ods starting on or after 1 October 2012.The FRC standard is commonly subse-
quent with the IAASB proposal. The legislation authorizes the EC (European 
Community) to embrace ISAs at the EU level. The above would help increase 
audit quality and encourage the plan of constant EU-wide audit services. Na-
tional standards applied in Member States will continue to be applicable if the 
EC has not adopted the ISAs concerning the same subject. 
 Audit committees: The legislation structure many of best practices of existing 
audit committee, including conditions for: 
 The independence of most the members 
 Auditing and/or accounting completeness from at least one member 
 The audit committee to have competence relevant to the sector in 
which the company operates. 
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Moreover, the law defines several duties for audit committees, involving, assigning the auditor 
and overseeing the company’s l reporting situation, and the efficiency of its internal quality 
control systems. Under the legislation, major responsibility of the audit committee remains the 
control of all legal audit forms. 
 Upholding persistent audit supervision across the EU: EY assists increased 
alignment among domestic audit regulators to integrate supervision, encour-
age integrated analysis and decrease the phenomenon of reproduction.  The 
member state level continues to be prevailing concerning the oversight of audit 
profession in the EU. The Committee of European Auditor Oversight Bodies 
(CEAOB), will strengthen the cooperation among the members of EU. 
 Audit market concentration and systemic risk: While the aim of the legislation 
may be to expand auditor choice, there is doubt about the variation of firms 
that are available for the companies to choose thus from the association of 
compulsory firm rotation and non-audit services constraints. The establishment 
of mandatory firm rotation is accompanied by more accepted rules to be fol-
lowed by the audit committee. In addition to the suggesting requirements, the 
legislation consists of several measures including prohibiting so-called “Big 4 
only” to remove difficulties to audit firm growth. The legislation admits the val-
ue of the dialogue between auditors and supervisors and describes the already 
existent communication, by enforcing supervisors and auditors of financial in-
stitutions to establish an effective dialogue and share the responsibility. Finally, 
at least yearly, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the new CEAOB 
must arrange a meeting with the auditors of all international systemically im-
portant financial institutions within the EU, in order to inform the ESRB of any 
significant developments in those institutions. 
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Literature Review 
In this chapter, there is a brief presentation of the already existed literature ac-
cording the topic of auditing and the most common determinants of audit fees so far. 
Starting with the innovating work of Simunic (1980), there were extensive studies 
analyzing the factors that determine the amount of audit fees in several countries. He 
created the basic model to explain the association between the amounts paid to their 
auditors by clients. As years passed, similar studies presented, trying to either support 
or broaden Simunic’s work using this very first model, with modifications, in different 
settings. Examples of studies in many countries are in the United Kingdom (Taylor and 
Baker, 1981; Taffler and Ramalinggam, 1982; Chan et al. 1993; Pong and Whittington 
1994; in USA (Francis and Simon, 1987; Palmrose, 1986), in Canada (Chung and Lind-
say, 1988; Anderson and Zeghal, 1994), in New Zealand (Firth, 1985; Johnson, Walker 
& Westergaard, 1995), in Australia (Francis, 1984; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Jubb et al. 
1996; Craswell and Francis, 1999) and in Japan (Taylor, 1997).Over the last years, sev-
eral studies have been presented with subject the impact of legal institutions on the 
quality of accounting information around the world (Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000; 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006; Bushman and Piotro-
ski 2006; DeFond, Hung and Trezevant 2007). They are located on the analytical 
framework designed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998), 
According to earlier research, the elements that affect the amount of fees can be   
classified into two groups: Auditee characteristics and auditor characteristics. The au-
ditee characteristics have been under extended analysis in earlier papers. They consist 
of client size (Simunic, 1980) risk (Hogan & Wilkins, 2008) complexity (Ghosh & Lust-
garten, 2006) and profitability (Hay, Knechel & Wong, 2006) and the type of industry 
(Basioudis and Ellwood, 2005). Audit fee models with the first three variables have 
been proved explanatory, and have shown consequence across different samples (De-
Fond et al., 2000). The auditor characteristics include auditor tenure (Yidi, 2011) and 
whether it is one from the Big Four companies (Mansi et al., 2004) as suggested from 
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previous studies. A classification of two groups is following: The first one related to the 
audited company and other to the characteristics of the auditor.  
Auditee characteristics 
 Auditee size: Auditee size is viewed as an important element in defining the 
audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). In various studies like (Simunic, 1980, 1984; Maher 
et al., 1992; Francis, 1984; Firth, 1985; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 
1996; Simon and Francis, 1988; Taylor and Baker, 1981; Chung and Lindsay, 
1988; Chan et al., 1993; Craswell and Francis, 1999; DeFond et al., 2000) this 
claim has been highlighted. The amount of external audit fee depends on the 
hours spent by the auditor in order to complete the audit work. In general, we 
suppose that the larger the company is, the longer the audit process, and thus 
the higher the audit cost will be. More specifically, big client will have a greater 
number of transactions, so, demands a more detailed audit process from the 
auditor, so, the auditor should pay more attention, which leads in higher audit 
fees (Simunic, 1980; Taylor & Simon, 1999; Meshari, 2008). The balance sheet 
items depict the company’s' size, like, total assets, stocks, debtors, creditors, 
etc. Size can also be estimated also by the profit and loss account items. The 
amount of total assets is the most prevalent measure used in previous studies 
to depict company size (Hay, Knechel & Wong, 2006; Waresul et al., 2012). For 
this study, we assume that there is a proportional relationship between audit 
fees and auditee size. 
 Auditee Complication: The complication of the company is one more compo-
nent influencing the amount of audit fees, as auditing process will be affected 
by the degree of the complication of the audited entity. Accordingly, it stands 
for that auditee companies with complications are charged with higher audit 
fees (Simunic, 1980). Various elements can be used to represent the complica-
tion of the company. Previous papers (Simunic, 1980; Francis & Simon, 1987; 
Joshi & Bastaki, 2000; Carson et al., 2004; Gonthier-Besacier & Schatt, 2007; 
Thinggaard and Kiertzner, 2008) comprised of specific  measures of complica-
12 
 
tion like the amount operating units, and the diversity of product lines. Moreo-
ver, there are other two types of complexity: legal and reporting complexity. 
The first is estimated by number of the company's subsidiaries and affiliates, 
and the number of countries in which the company operates, and the second, 
by number of separate audit reports issued annually for the company such as 
financial statements and separate reports on subsidiaries and affiliates. Gener-
ally, the empirical evidence in most cases supports a positive association be-
tween audit fees and complexity, thus, we assume that the greater the com-
plexity of the company the higher the audit fees. Maher et al.,1992; Chan et al., 
1993; Che Ahmad and Houghton, 1996; Carcello et al., 2002) 
 Auditee risk: Audit risk, that indicates the risk connected with implementing an 
audit procedure is, is hard to measure, as argued by prior research (Chan et al., 
1993).  If the audit level of audit risk is affected auditor's responsibility, should 
be also taken into consideration in the calculation of audit fees. This responsi-
bility correlated to the risk involved, accordingly, the more risk involved in the 
audit work the greater the responsibility which deserves a higher fee of audi-
tor's compensation for taking that risk. A study done by Sun and Liu (2011) in-
dicated that the client with high level of risk will force the external auditors to 
perform audit procedures efficiently; therefore, financial risk must be com-
bined in audit program to define "red flags" signals that will show opportunities 
of fraudulent activities. In banks, such indicators can be complex contracts with 
high-risk borrowers. In addition, Firth (1993) find out that higher level of client 
risk will increase the auditor effort which result in higher audit fees. Further-
more, Hay and Knechel (2004) found that the claim for auditing is a function of 
the set of risks faced by stakeholders in an organization and set of control 
mechanisms available for moderating those risks. We conclude that exist posi-
tive association between client's risk and level of audit fees. Auditee risk and 
Auditee complexity are the two items that compose the term ‘bank regulatory 
risk. 
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 Auditee profitability:  an important variable that reflect the effectiveness of 
management performance and with a leading role in determining audit fees. 
The auditee profitability is depicted in the income or loss figure presented 
through the income statement. Profitable firms pay more audit fees to their ex-
ternal auditors in the sense that higher profits may require detailed audit test-
ing of the entity for the identification of revenue and expenses which require 
more audit time (Joshi and Al-Bastaki, 2000). The most common variables used 
to measure profitability are profitability ratio and a dummy variable for the ex-
istence of a loss. Only few researchers (Simon and Francis, 1988; Joshi and Al-
Bastaki, 2000; Whisenant et al., 2003) have used profitability in their studies. In 
summary while the association between client's profitability and the amount of 
audit fees seems rather obvious there are metrics that can capture market dy-
namics. At last, we conclude to a positive correlation between the variable of 
profitability and audit fees. 
 Type of Industry: The industry type is another significant variable in calculation 
of audit fees. Specific industries like banking need different audit work because 
of their natures. In banking sector, especially in the European Union, things are 
more peculiar due to the continuous economic crisis that has affected in a 
great level its operations. Also, this sector is consisted of banks, insurance 
companies, investment banks, credit unions, thrifts, advisory firms, and credit 
card issuers, among others, fact that make more complex the examining sector. 
These industries are subject of different accounting policies.  The identification 
of certain audit areas and analysis of records need specific skills. Previous stud-
ies have shown that there is possible association between the level of audit 
fees and the type of Industry. Gonthier, Besacier and Schatt (2007) found that 
the level of audit fees paid by French listed firms under the IT sector is higher 
than that paid by firms belong to other sectors. Hence, manufacturing compa-
nies require more auditing procedures which result in higher audit fees than 
other companies. Nonetheless, unlike industrial firm auditors, the leading bank 
auditors appear to be incapable to use their market dominance to reclaim this 
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fee discount. One possible explanation for this finding is that dominant bank 
auditors price their audits more competitively than they perhaps could with the 
aim gain access to clients with greater non-audit service needs. The expectation 
is that variables in the sectors have some significance; however, a specific be-
havior (positive or negative) is not initially expected. 
Auditor’s Characteristics 
 Auditor size: The size of audit firm is a significant element in the cost of audit 
services. Many previous studies have shown interest in examining whether au-
dit fees paid to “Big” audit firms are higher than fees paid to “non-Big” firms. 
Big four audit firms have greater competence due to large-scale operations. 
Moreover, they have more resources that invest in training their staff, technol-
ogy and facilities. The reason of studying the audit firm size stems from the as-
sumption that the size depicts the audit quality. Here, it should be noted that, 
the big audit firms were once known as the "Big Eight", and were reduced to 
the "Big Six" and then "Big Five" by a series of mergers, and the Big Five be-
came the Big Four after the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002, following its 
connection with the Enron scandal. Some of previous studies claim that there is 
no association between audit fees and auditor size e.g. the study by Meshari 
(2008) indicated that the audit firm size (“Big” audit firm vs “non-Big” audit 
firm) is not statistically influential in determining the amount of audit fees sup-
porting similar studies like, Firth, 1985; Chung and Lindsay, 1988; Brinn et al., 
1994. On the other hand, Walid (2012) pointed out that the size of the audit 
firm is important factor in affecting the amount of external audit fees in Leba-
non. Moreover, studies from Palmrose, 1996; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Chan et 
al., 1993, reporting an evidence of a fee premium paid to “Big” firms. Nowa-
days, the Big 4 audit firms prevail the audit services market, and consequently, 
are harder for smaller firms to enter the market of big companies. Moreover, 
the fee paid to big audit firms may be higher than that of non-big ones, due to 
the reputation that those companies have. To this point we conclude that the 
opinions differ as the results from previous research are mixed, so further re-
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search of this issue is needed. In this study, will employ audit firm size (Big four 
as a dummy variable) to measure the auditor size, in order t to find the associa-
tion with the amount of audit fee. 
 Auditor tenure, is also considered as an important variable of determination of 
audit fees. After the collapse of Enron and WorldCom association between au-
dit quality and auditor tenure has been constantly disputed (e.g., Jackson et al, 
2008; Daniels & Booker, 2011). Belen et al., (2014) studied the auditor tenure 
association with audit quality by using a sample of 254 audits carried out on 
Spanish state-owned foundations between 2003 and 2010. The results show 
that audit quality, measured as the possibility that an auditor will give a quali-
fied opinion, increases over the first five years of the relationship and then de-
creases. Still, Jackson et. al (2008) conclude that audit tenure can increase audit 
quality. On the other hand, Bedard and Johnstone (2010) reveal a correlation 
between audit fees and audit tenure of American companies. This study sug-
gests that audit partners contribute more audit effort in the first year of en-
gagement and that a long tenure means thorough knowledge of the client, 
which leads to a more valuable relationship between the client and the auditor. 
This variable will not be taken into consideration in this study. 
Bank’s Characteristics 
The above was some of the most common variables used as determinants of the 
audit fees. Our fee model will be focused on: Liquidity Risk, Operating Risk, Credit Risk, 
Capital Risk and Market Risk 
 Liquidity Risk: the possibility that the bank cannot meet its obligations for cash 
through the clearing system or from its depositors. Bank liquidity risk is com-
posed by transactions accounts and investment securities. Transactions ac-
counts occur from the basic banking function of providing means of payment to 
consumers and businesses. Banks with large numbers of transactions accounts 
automatically have more complex activities that are costly to implement and to 
control. Transactions accounts include noninterest- earning demand deposit 
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accounts (DDAs), interest-bearing checking accounts in the form of negotiable 
order of withdrawal accounts (NOWs), automatic transfer from savings (ATS) 
accounts, money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), although the number of 
transactions is limited in these accounts. Banks with a higher percentage of 
transactions accounts face greater liquidity risk and operational complexity. As 
result, these banks should have higher audit fees. As far as investment securi-
ties are concerned, most bank portfolios contain relatively short-term, liquid 
instruments with rationally stable, valid values. Fraser et al. (2001) document 
that about 25% of securities held by commercial banks have maturities of less 
than one year, and almost 40% have maturities between one and five years.  
 Operating Risk: the possibility of high operating costs decreasing the capital ac-
count of the bank. Efficiency ratio is a generally used measure of operating risk 
for banking organizations ––defined as the ratio of total operating expense to 
total revenue (net interest income plus non-interest income). The higher the ef-
ficiency ratio is, the lower the efficiency for the bank is and therefore, the more 
difficult is for the bank to draw a profit and so to boost its capital account. The 
efficiency ratio could also be considered as a clue for the complexity of bank 
operations. High efficiency ratios arise from large non-interest expenses rela-
tive to revenue generation, like personnel, branches, and data processing ex-
penses. These expenses are proofs of large volumes of transactions accounts 
and with a geographically dispersed branch system. We anticipate that banks 
with lower efficiency should have higher audit fees, both due to transaction 
volume and geographic dispersion that complicate the audit function and cre-
ate notable operating risk. 
 Credit Risk: at first concerns the quality of the bank’s assets and the probabili-
ties of default in its loan portfolio, may also exist in the securities portfolio. 
Credit risk is the main risk faced by most banking organizations around the 
world. Popular measures of bank credit risk associate with banks loan portfolio 
synthesis and loan quality. Commercial loans typically include commercial and 
industrial loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances issued by other 
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banks, and obligations (other than securities) of states and political parties, and 
commercial mortgage and agricultural loans. These loans are made for short-
term working capital purposes like financing receivables and inventory, and ex-
panding plant and equipment. Many commercial loans are extended under the 
broadest sense of credit in which the timing and the amount of the loans are 
decided by the actions of the borrower. Commercial loans are complex transac-
tions and often suggest significant collaterals. The commercial loan portfolio al-
so lacks transparency, by that measuring and monitoring costs are increasing. 
One more important element of this type of portfolio is that is increasingly syn-
dicated. For smaller banks, which are the buyers of syndicated loans, the port-
folio is remarkably more difficult to evaluate because the buying bank did not 
implement the primary credit evaluation for the loan. A positive relationship 
between audit fees and the proportion of commercial loans in an institutions 
total loan portfolio is expected since banks with more commercial loans are 
likely to have greater credit risk and less loan portfolio transparency. This rela-
tionship carries an importance to banks with large number of non-performing 
loans and/or deficient loan loss reserves. 
The final measure of credit risk is residential mortgage loans. Residential 
mortgage loans generally concern bank loans secured by 1–4 family residences. 
Those loans commonly have very low default rates and even if a default occurs, 
the loss to the bank is usually small. The securitization of those loans has sub-
stantially reduced lender's credit risk but here there is a trap. Most residential 
mortgage loans are packaged as securities and sold to outside investors and 
engaged to hedging strategies to mitigate the interest rate risk during the time 
that these loans are held prior to their packaging into portfolios. The related 
lack of transparency in these hedging strategies proposes that audit effort and 
audit fees should be proportional to the residential mortgage loans in an insti-
tution’s portfolio. 
 Capital Risk: refers to the possibility that reduction in the value of assets will 
decrease the equity account of the bank. Our main measure for capital risk is 
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the total risk-adjusted capital ratio, defined as the total amount of bank regula-
tory capital (i.e., common equity, perpetual preferred stock, loan loss reserves, 
and some types of subordinated debt) divided by risk-weighted assets. Under 
Basel III, the minimum capital adequacy ratio that banks must maintain is 8%. 
Here, two opinions have risen. On one hand, regulators expect from banks with 
higher risk are to maintain larger regulatory capital buffers, in this situation a 
positive relationship would be expected between the risk-adjusted capital ratio 
and audit fees. On the other hand, banks with lower levels of risk-adjusted cap-
ital are riskier, so we conclude that a negative relationship between risk-
adjusted capital and audit fees may arise. 
Intangible assets are also used as a proxy for capital risk, with a less di-
rect link than   risk-adjusted capital ratio. Bank intangibles typically depict 
goodwill resulting from mergers and acquisitions. Banks with large amounts of 
intangible assets is possible to be more complex organizations and may also be 
viewed as having rather aggressive, due to their acquisition activities. Because 
goodwill is deducted in the calculation of regulatory capital, banks that are ag-
gressive may impair their capital account. Finally, intangibles include the no-
tions of complexity and capital risk, thus, is expected that banks with high level 
of intangible assets will have higher audit fees. 
Market Risk: is about the potential impact that the negative movement in interest 
rates will threaten the financial viability of the bank.   A sixth measure of bank financial 
condition was added in 1997, to the CAMEL rating system. This measure 'S' stands for 
‘‘Sensitivity’’ that denotes how much bank's profitability, assets and liabilities are sen-
sitive to market changes. The focus is on Interest rate risk that is calculated as interest-
sensitive assets minus interest-sensitive liabilities. A positive value means asset sensi-
tive position, a negative one means liability sensitive position and a value of zero 
shows that the bank is perfectly matched and should experience little change in profit 
or asset valuation due to interest rate changes. A positive/negative value indicates that 
banks should increase/decrease their interest rates. The relationship between fees and 
interest rate sensitivity will depend on a banks exposure at a given point.
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Research methodology    
 In this chapter is presented the plan of the followed research methodology, the 
included variables, the econometric model, the initial results and the robustness test 
that has been carried out. 
Research methodology applied in this study followed a series of levels: in the first 
level, were studied  the most significant contributions in the subject in the form  of the 
literature; in the second level were determined the theoretical components of the 
model, and the parameters that will be used; in the third level was used a statistical 
program for data processing to establish the correlations and co-variations of parame-
ters; in the fourth level, was established a linear model of mathematical regression to 
measure the amount of fees according to the chosen parameters. The kind of research 
assigned is the explanatory research with the purpose to investigate the connection 
between concepts: the influence of several parameters (total assets, net income, effi-
ciency ratio etc.), to the amount of auditor’s fees. 
 The matter that was chosen as the subject of this research is the audit phenome-
non which is investigated as it is observed at the level of European Union banks. Con-
cerning the study performed, we aim to interpret the factors that affect the level of 
audit fees that banks are required to pay and the correlation between them. 
Model specification  
This study uses an audit fee model consisting of explanatory variables commonly 
used as key elements of audit fees in prior studies with the addition of some elements 
believed that can reveal some additional characteristics of audit fees in banking sector. 
These explanatory variables are included in a cross-sectional audit fee regression mod-
el based on fee models employed by prior research. 
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Data and summary statistics 
The sample contains 136 European banks that reported audit fees in 2010-2015 fis-
cal years. This sample includes 136 banks. Due to the growing similarity among these 
institutions and for ease of discussion, we refer to all the organizations in the sample 
as ‘‘banks.’’  The followed strategy concerns active banks in the region of European 
Union, with available account information and an unqualified auditor’s opinion given 
for fiscal years 2010-2015. 
Data for our sample of banks were obtained from Banscope and Thomson data-
bases. Selected summary measures are presented in Table 1. Column 1 of Table 1 de-
scribes the summary measure and Column 2 presents the name of the associated re-
gression variable. Furthermore, due to the presence of a few very large organizations 
(e.g., HSBC Holdings Plc, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank AG) our emphasis is on median 
values. 
Table 2-Financial Information 
Selected summary data for 131 bank holding companies reported audit fees for fiscal 
years 2010-2015 
Variable Regression 
Variable 
Mean Median Min Max 
Audit fee ($ mil) LOGFEE 7,721 1,325 0,026 128,414 
Market value of eq-
uity ($ mil) 
- 14,586 2,182 -2,694 199 
Total assets ($ mil) LOGASS 252,874 20,362 0,022 2800 
Total deposits ($ mil) - 142,8 17,4 0,032 2700 
Net income ($ mil) - 0,0093 0,053 -18,714 17,932 
Std. Dev. of returns 
(1 year) 
STDRET 0,027 0,025 0,006 0,085 
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Table 2 demonstrates that banks in our sample range in market capitalization from 
approximately $-2.7 million (National Bank of Greece)) to over $199 million (HSBC 
Holdings Plc), with a median value of $132 million. Total assets have a median value of 
approximately $2.1 billion and median year-end deposits are $17.4 million. The medi-
an audit fee for the banks in our sample is $1.32 million. Like the other measures, the 
distribution of net income across our sample banks is wide, ranging from a loss of over 
$18.7 million to a proﬁt of over $17.9 million. Our measure of general equity risk, the 
standard deviation of stock returns for one year previous the end of the 2015 ﬁscal 
year, is commonly used in the assurance fee literature. The standard deviation of re-
turns for our sample is much lower (median of 2.5%) than that typically documented in 
studies of IPO ﬁrms. This result is not surprising, of course, because established ﬁrms, 
particularly banks, are likely to have lower levels of equity risk than ﬁrms that have re-
cently entered the public equity markets.  
Table 3-Liquidity Risk Measures 
Liquidity Risk Measures 
Variable Regression 
Variable 
Mean Median Min Max 
Net loans/total 
assets (%) 
NETLASS 54,464 60,431 0,1848 90,975 
Securities/total 
assets 
SECURITIES 0,2014 0,187 0,066 0,264 
 
The long-term debt to total assets ratio is roughly 60%, depicting the global bank-
ing crisis of last years. As far as the securities to total assets ratio is concerned alt-
hough a high ratio may indicate some degree of safety from a creditor's viewpoint, ex-
cess amounts of cash may be viewed as inefficient. In this situation, the numbers are 
quite moderate, presented a rather difficult period for banks’ liquidity potential 
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Table 4-Operating Risk Measures 
Operating Risk Measures 
Variable Regression 
Variable 
Mean Median Min Max 
Efficiency 
ratio 
EFFICICENCY 0,674 0,610 0,2963 3,0251 
 
The mean and median values for the eﬃciency ratio are both approximately 60%, 
suggesting that for the banks in our sample, roughly 60 cents of every dollar of reve-
nue goes to pay operating expenses. The FDICs Quarterly Banking Proﬁle reported that 
all banks averaged an eﬃciency ratio of 57.7% in 2016, so our sample banks appear to 
be comparable to the industry. 
Table 5-Credit Risk Measures 
Credit Risk Measures 
Variable Regression 
Variable 
Mean Median Min Max 
Commercial 
loans/gross 
loans 
COMMLOAN 0,3914 0,4257 0,2324 0,5369 
Non-
performing 
loans/gross 
loans (%) 
NONPERFORM 9,6967 6,412 0,3858 57,534 
Net charge-
offs/loan loss 
reserve (%) 
NETCHAROFF 29,301 18,422 -535,714 705,556 
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Mortgage 
loans/gross 
loans 
MTGLOANS 0,6651 1,934 24,887 0,5532 
 
Table 5 provides information on loan portfolio composition and credit risk. Since 
the start of the crisis, the distribution of NPL has been highly unequal among Member 
States, with crisis-hit countries suffering major increases in NPL ratios. At the end of 
September 2015, the two countries which had to implement strict capital controls, 
Greece and Cyprus, reported NPL ratio of more than 40%. This is a rather high number 
by historical standards. 
Table 6-Capital Risk Measures 
Capital Risk Measures 
Variable Regression 
Variable 
Mean Median Min Max 
Risk-
adjusted 
capital ratio 
(%) 
CAPRATIO 15,56 15,03 -4,18 40,2 
Intangible 
assets/total 
assets 
INTANG 0,012 0,021 0,008 0,0132 
The measures in Table 6 are representative measures for capital risk. For our 236 banks 
the median risk-adjusted capital ratio is 15.3%. For comparison purposes, the risk-adjusted 
capital ratio for all banks of Eurozone as of December 31, 2015, was 10.2%. Finally, the ratio of 
intangible assets reveals the increasing activity of banks during the last years with mean and 
median of 12% and 21% respectively. 
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Table 7-Market Risk Measures 
Market Risk Measures 
Variable Regression 
Variable 
Mean Median Min Max 
(Sensitive) 
Assets-
Liabilities 
SENSITIVE 0,060 0,039 0,471 0,658 
 
The positive gap, result of subtraction (sensitive) liabilities from assets, indicates 
that there are more assets than liabilities in the given sample. If interest rates increase, 
bank’s gross profits, the difference between what pays for its liabilities and earns on its 
assets, will decline (ceteris paribus) because the value of its rate-sensitive liabilities ex-
ceeds that of its rate-sensitive assets. 
Table 8-Auditors’ Information 
Audit Firm # of 
Audits 
% of Au-
dits 
Median 
audit 
fee ($ 
mil) 
Median 
client 
assets ($ 
mil) 
Median 
Client 
MVE ($ 
mil) 
Deloitte & Touche 
 
35 25% 14,8 14,255 1,556 
KPMG 34 24% 3,68 26,142 2,552 
PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers 
32 23% 3,11 27,382 1,280 
Ernst & Young 21 15% 10,82 23,690 2,638 
Mazars 4 2.7% 0,31 12,340 0,386 
All others 10 7.35% 1,8 12,652 2,035 
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In Table 8 we dissect selected data items by audit ﬁrm. This table reveals that for 
the sample of 136 banks that Deloitte & Touche has the highest audit market share 
(25%) followed with little difference from KPMG (24%), when market share is deﬁned 
in terms of the number of institutions audited. Even though Deloitte & Touche is the 
leading company, as far as median audit fees are concerned, we observe Ernst & 
Young with market share of 15% charge quite expensive it’s services with 10.8 million $ 
average audit fee. An interesting point can arise from the fact that KPMG and Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers which have similar % of market share and average audit fees have 
the clients with the higher average assets with approximately 26 and 27 million $ re-
spectively while Deloitte & Touche has average clients’ assets of 14 million $. It is also 
interesting to note that 7.35% of the banks, in our sample, that constitutes the 12.6 
million of average total assets, were audited by non-Big 4 accounting ﬁrms. Finally, 
concerning equity, Ernst & Young and KPMG are the companies with the higher clients’ 
equity, besides the fact that the latter has almost 10% fewer clients than the first one. 
Notable can be the fact that PricewaterhouseCoopers clients’ equity is smaller than 
the equity of the sum of the smaller auditing firms.
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Fee model and outcomes 
Fee model  
The model comes from elements generally used in the audit literature. The regres-
sion comprises of audit fees, elements concerning ﬁrm size, complexity and risk. The 
form of the model is as follows: 
Econometric Approach 
 We estimate the econometric model in cross section (with a time dimension of 6 
years), the form of the model is as follows: 
LOGFEEj=α0+α1LOGASSj+α2BIG5j+α3STDRETj 
+α4NETLASS+α5SECURITIESj+α6EFFICIENCYj 
+α7COMMLOANj+α8NONPERFORMj+α9CHGOFFj 
+α10MTGLOANj+α11CAPRATIOj+c12INTANGj 
+α13SENSITIVEj +ej.        (1) 
α0   is a constant and ej  represents model remainders. 
In the first equation, LOGFEE is the natural logarithm of the audit fee, LOGASS is 
the natural logarithm of total assets, and BIG5 is a barometer describing whether 
banks are audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms or not. Taking into consideration pre-
vious re-search we suppose the coeﬃcients for LOGASS and BIG5 to be positive. 
STDRET is proxy for ﬁrm risk that often is used in the fee literature. STDRET is the one-
year standard deviation of daily stock returns. Previous studies have shown mixed and 
insignificant results concerning this coefficient. The ratio of net loans/total assets pro-
vides a general measure of the long-term financial position of a company, including its 
ability to meet financial requirements for outstanding loans therefore, α4 should be 
positive. With respect to our other measure of liquidity risk, securities are liquid assets 
that are also comparatively easy to value. Thus, audit risk and auditor’s eﬀort should 
be decreasing in SECURITIES. SECURITIES are defined in the regression model as [1 mi-
27 
 
nus (securities/total assets)]. A positive coeﬃcient shows that banks with lower level 
of securities to total assets will be charged with higher fees. 
When a bank shows great operating efficiency, this lead to lower operating risk 
which is a sign of successful bank management. It is supposed that banks with lower 
operating risk are charged with lower audit fees.  The other are variables––
COMMLOAN, NONPERFORM, CHGOFF, and MTGLOAN––proxy for bank credit risk. As 
mentioned before the audit fees will increase as those risk increase. CAPRATIO and 
INTANG are our main measures for capital risk. Higher levels of CAPRATIO make us ex-
pect α11 to be positive. Similarly, because more complex, risk-taking banks are likely to 
have higher relative levels of intangible assets and because goodwill decrease banks 
regulatory capital, banks with acquisition activity require greater audit eﬀort and have 
higher capital risks. Therefore, the coefficient for INTANG should be positive. 
The ﬁnal variable is SENSITIVE. Here, we expect a negative relationship between 
SENSITIVE and audit fees. Because gap measures typically are noisy representations of 
interest rate risk; thus, we expect the relationship between LOGFEE and SEN-SITIVE to 
be less strong than the relationship between fees and the other measures of risk and 
complexity. 
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Explanatory variables correlation with dependent variable 
Correlation analysis is the first step to measure the relationship between the variables and 
its strength. Correlation coefficients provides a summary of the strength and direction of the 
linear relationship between two variables. The association between variables can be presented 
in a scatter plot. Table 9 shows the correlation of explanatory variables with auditing expenses. 
Table 9-Variables’ Correlations 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. AF 1.000          
2. ΤΑ 0,997 1.000         
3. Big 5  0,352 0,10 1.000        
4. NL/ΤΑ  0,034 0.036 -0,060 1.000       
5. Efficiency 0,036 0.047 0,410 0.072 1.000      
6. NPL/GL -0,112 -0.117 0,390 0.193 -0.045 1.000     
7. ML/GL -0,047 -0.048 0,130 0.061 0.008 0.55 1.000    
8. RACR 0,082 -0.93 0,221 0.079 0.062 0.178 0.103 1.000   
9. IA/TA 0,060 -0.71 0,270 -0,212 0,791 -0,085 -0,013 -0,043 1.000  
10. SA-L 0,059 0.06 0,300 -0,043 0,014 -0,179 0,069 0,117 0,141 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (1-tailed).  
Some exploratory observations on the initial correlations are worth displayed: 
Strong positive correlation between the audit fees and total assets represent the cli-
ent’s size, being in line with initial expectations. In line with the expectation that BIG N 
firms charge premium fees, the variable BIG N provided a positive but weak correla-
tion; Another observation is the low correlation between variables of net loans to total 
assets ratio and efficiency ratio. The liquidity risk proxies show negative and weak cor-
relations and don’t follow the initial pattern. Finally, the intangible to total assets ratio 
and the (sensitive) assets-liabilities correlations are positive but at the same time weak 
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Initial Results 
We make a short table reminding the variables and their meaning: 
Table 10-Variables’ Explanation 
LOGFEE logarithm of audit fee 
LOGAS logarithm of total assets. 
 
BIG5 1 if auditor is a Big 5 accounting ﬁrm, 
 0 otherwise. 
STDRET standard deviation of daily returns for 250 trading 
days preceding ﬁscal year-end. 
 
NETLASS 
 
net loans/total assets ratio 
SECURITIES (1)- (total securities/total assets)]. 
EFFICIENCY (total operating expenses/total revenue). 
COMMLOAN total commercial and agricultural loans/gross 
loans. 
 
NONPERFORM nonperforming loans/gross loans. 
 
CHGOFF net charge-oﬀs/loan loss reserve. 
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MTGLOAN total domestic real estate and home equity 
loans/gross loans. 
 
CAPRATIO 
 
total risk-adjusted capital ratio. 
INTANG 
 
intangible assets/total assets. 
SENSITIVE rate-sensitive assets minus rate-sensitive liabilities 
 
We report the results from the Equation (1) in Table 3. In almost every case the 
coeﬃcient estimates are both statistically signiﬁcant and of the expected sign. 
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Table 11-SPSS Results 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient          
Estimate 
t-Statistics 
INTERCEPT + 2.580  
LOGASS + 0.514 31.57 
BIG5 + 0.325 3.98 
STDRET + 0.475 0.17 
NETLASS + 0.006 2.01 
SECURITIES + 0.247 2.56 
EFFICICENCY + 0.241 2.52 
COMMLOAN + 0.005 3.65 
NONPERFORM + 0.004 3.46 
NETCHAROFF + 0.005 1.68 
MTGLOANS + 0.035 2.61 
CAPRATIO + 0.007 0.94 
INTANG + 0.078 1.51 
SENSITIVE - -0.0006 -0.51 
Adjusted R-
square 
0.94   
 
The confidence interval 95% has the same significance as for p>t. for instance, with 
a confidence of 95% (or a threshold of 5%), the coefficient assets ranges within that 
respective interval. We should keep in mind that at 5% this coefficient is not signifi-
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cant, namely it may be equal to 0. As it can be seen, the figure 0 can be found within 
the confidence interval at 95%, which confirms our previous interpretation. 
As previous studies, have shown, fees are higher for large banks in respect of total 
assets and are also higher if the auditor is a Big 4 ﬁrm. It was also found that both of 
our industry-specific measures of liquidity risk are statistically signiﬁcant. NETASS is 
positively related to audit fees, indicating that banks with a high long-term debt to as-
set ratio, it suggests the business has a rather high degree of risk and suggest more at-
tention from auditors. The positive relationship between audit fees and SECURITIES (1 
minus securities/assets), indicating that banks with higher the variable of SECURITIES 
but in fact less, due to the ratio function, audit firms charging more to audit banks that 
have less liquid and transparent asset portfolios. 
 As far as proxies for operating risk, loan complexity and credit risk are concerned, 
positive relationships and statistical significance were found. More specifically, audit 
fees are increasing in cases of high efficiency ratio meaning that operating expenses 
are greater than total revenues. In both commercial loans (COMMLOAN) and residen-
tial mortgage loans (MTGLOAN) is observed a similar situation. Both findings are per-
sistent with the argument of Khurana and Kim (2003) that loans involve more audit 
attention with respect to defining fair value. The coeﬃcient estimates for NONPER-
FORM and CHGOFF are positive and signiﬁcant as well, indicating that auditors request 
more from banks that have lower quality loan portfolios. The importance of these vari-
ables in our fee model may be indicative of audit ﬁrm concerns regarding potential liti-
gation.  
The ﬁnal three variables in Eq. (1) are CAPRATIO, INTANG, and SENSITIVE. The 
econometric model reveals a positive, signiﬁcant relation between the risk-adjust capi-
tal ratio (CAPRATIO) and audit fees. This finding indicates that auditors charge higher 
fees to banks that are required by regulators to maintain higher levels of regulatory 
capital. The signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient estimate for INTANG involves that banks 
with a history of acquisition activity are charged more by audit firms. Finally, the 
coeﬃcient estimate for SENSITIVE is not statistically signiﬁcant; meaning that, auditors 
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do not appear to price bank market risks. A possible explanation can be that interest 
rate sensitivity disclosures simply do not sufficiently capture banks market risks.  
Summarizing, our findings suggest that audit firms take into consideration factors 
like liquidity risk, operating risk, credit risk, capital risk, but not market risk as indicat-
ed. As mentioned previously those factors included in monitoring systems developed 
by federal regulatory agencies. The explanatory power of our model is also higher (ad-
justed r-square 94.7%) than that which typically is reported in the fee literature, imply-
ing that the presence of signiﬁcant regulatory pressures may enhance the association 
between fees and client-speciﬁc risks. Finally, the economic significance of the audit 
pricing eﬀects arising from these risk factors is material. 
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Factor analysis of banks risks 
In previous section, we defined five primary bank risks considered important for 
the regulatory bodies. The variables used in the econometric model are proxies for 
these risks. Table 12 presents the standardized scoring coefficients correlated to each 
of the five risks claimed in the analysis. We identify the risks as: liquidity, credit, capi-
tal, market and operating. 
Table 12-SPSS Results with banks’ risks 
Variable Liquidity 
risk 
Credit 
risk 
Market 
risk 
Capital 
risk 
Operating 
risk 
NETLASS 0,115 -0,105 0,672 0,065 0,513 
SECURITIES 0,046 0,614 0,148 -0,114 0,768 
EFFICICENCY 0,145 0,180 0,110 0,236 0.319 
COMMLOAN -0,354 -0,870 0,015 -0,003 0,207 
NONPERFORM -0,027 -0,145 -0.010 0,506 0,480 
NETCHAROFF -0,023 -0,008 0,010 0,487 0,410 
MTGLOANS 0,478 -0,006 0,051 -0,039 0.174 
CAPRATIO 0,320 -0,422 0,265 0,040 0,366 
INTANG 0,060 0.036 -0.004 -0,007 0,305 
SENSITIVE -0,056 0,070 0,545 -0,030 0,472 
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Table 13-Regression model with risks included 
 Coefficient Estimate t-Statistics 
INTERCEPT 4,365 17,84 
LOGASS 0,601 31,52 
BIG5 0,205 3,01 
STDRET 0,364 0,09 
LIQUIDITY RISK -0,004 -0,19 
CREDIT RISK 0,124 3,98 
MARKET RISK 0,063 2,51 
CAPITAL RISK 0,112 3,60 
OPERATING RISK 0,085 2,78 
Adjusted R-square 0,78  
 
According to Table 13 liquidity risk is not viewed significantly important to auditors’ 
consideration in the process of charging banks’ audit fees. On the other hand, credit, 
market and capital risk are considered quite essential in the determination of audit 
fees. As far as operating risk is considered, we discern a moderate relationship with 
the audit fees decision. Finally, this approach can be viewed as a more general and 
parsimonious approach to the topic of identifying the audit fee determinants. 
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Audit fees according banks’ size 
Table 14-Audit fee model for above-median asset  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Above-median 
Asset banks         t-Statistics 
Below-median 
Asset banks      t- Statistics 
INTERCEPT + 1.7165 2.75 2.8534 3.03 
LOGASS + 0.5784 17.85 0.5127 9.52 
BIG5 + 0.3124 3.20 0.2022 3.48 
STDRET + 8.431 1.67 -2.3517 -0.82 
NETLASS + 0.0072 2.59 -0.0001 -0.01 
SECURITIES + 0.2571 0.77 0.5665 2.10 
EFFICICENCY + 0.0058 2.36 0.0079 2.33 
COMMLOAN + 0.0081 3.09 0.0053 1.84 
NONPERFORM + 0.1046 1.55 0.0046 1.44 
NETCHAROFF + -0.0003 -0.16 0.0033 2.03 
MTGLOANS + 0.0054 2.34 0.0009 0.32 
CAPRATIO + 0.0063 0.72 0.0094 1.50 
INTANG + 0.1026 3.55 0.0505 1.62 
SENSITIVE - -0.002 -0.95 -0.0005 -0.35 
Adjusted R-
square 
0.87   
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Generally large bank holding companies have considerably different risk figures 
than small banks. This particularity comes from the complex economic profiles and the 
greater sources of liquidity that larger banks have in contrast with small ones.  
Literatute has shown that  large banks have the ability to function with lower ratios of 
capital and typically are involved  in riskier operations. The size of the institution may 
affect the pricing policy of banks. In Table 7 are presented  results from estimating the 
fee model individually  for ‘‘large’’ and ‘‘small’’ banks. The size distinction is 
determined by whether the bank has total assets above or below the median level 
(approximately $20,362 million) for the entire sample. 
Table 7 shows the model variables differantiate according banks' assets.For first 
variables concerning size, audit quality,long term debt to total assets ratio,operating 
efficiency, and commercial loans, there is evidence that audit fees are priced 
comparably for both large and small banks. However, several  differences have been 
observed. Mortgage loans and intangible assets affest positively fees at large banks but 
not at small banks. We assume that these results come from the fact that auditors put 
greater effort  in activities like  loan portfolios evaluation and M&A of larger and more 
complex institutions. With respect to intangible assets this result is connected to the  
auditors pricing litigation risks that rationally are greater for large banks.The volume of 
non performing loans (NONPERFORM) is significantly and positively related to audit 
fees for the large bank subsample, but not for the small bank subsample. This finding is 
obvious if we consider the much greater scale and complexity in geographical and 
organizational terms of larger banks. 
CAPRATIO is slightly significant (p < 0,06) for the  small banks rather that large 
banks. Smaller banks are obligated to have high levels of CAPRATIO and for this reason 
are charged with higher fees that large banks.Subsequently, several differences are 
presented concerning liquitidy risk of small and large banks. As far as   SECURITIES, are 
concerned, in small banks are used as a mean of serving their liquitidy needs while this 
in not happening with large banks Accordingly , the SECURITIES variable possibly  is a 
more suitable measure  for liquidity risk for small banks than for large banks. 
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Concluding remarks 
In this chapter are presented the concluding marks that result from the above 
analysis. 
The aim of this paper is to determine which client characteristics are the 
fundamental factors that affect the pricing of banks' audit fees. In this context were 
used extensive industry-specific disclosures to test the hypothesis that were 
developed. This setting is significant for many reasons. Firstly, because it permits us  to 
extent the general audit fee model into a different and greater  institutional context 
and because it give us the ability  to explore the degree to which bank audits are priced 
respectively to national regulatory monitoring systems. Our results demonstrate that 
audit fees are higher for banks having higher long term debt to total assets ratio, fewer 
securities as a percentage of total assets, higher efficiency ratios and higher levels of 
credit risk like mortgage loans. In institutions that have higher risk adjusted capital 
ratios and more intangible assets, were also observed higher audit fees.  As far as 
regulatory agencies are considered, the areas documented as important by them with 
respect to fees, are consistent with the findings of this survey. 
Moreover it was  found that there is no dominating   audit firm controls in the 
banking sector. As a result ,the auditors of topo banks cannot charge a feee premium 
the top bank auditors cannot ask for larger ammount of fees for their services as in 
reality are not offer any special services An alternative aspect is that industry leading 
audit firms may are not interested in gaining an ‘‘audit specialization premium’’ to gain 
access to clients with greater non-audit service demands. In recent bibliography other 
services that audit, like consulting are presented to have rapid growth where audit 
work is often viewed as something of a loss leader. Considerable examples are: 
General Electric paid KPMG $23.9 million for auditing work and $79.7 million for other 
services. Meanwhile, J.P. Morgan Chase paid PricewaterhouseCoopers $21.3 million in 
audit fees, but $84.2 million for additional work. 
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While significant insights into the variables that determine audit fees at the 
individual bank and industry level are provided, at the same time   are given important 
policy conclusions. First, accounting firms need to devote satisfactory resources to 
audits of issues viewed as important by regulators, if not there is a serious possibility 
of procedure revaluation. The mitigation of extensive litigation risks that exist in the 
banking industry should be one of the first auditor's concerns in the internal audit 
function. Moreover, regulators depend heavily on external auditors as they evaluate 
banks  financial condition. Finally, extremely important is believed to be the alignment 
of processes followed by internal and external auditors in the sake of decreasing costs 
and general deficiencies. Bank managers suggest that audit committees should 
encourage such an alignment. An improvement of the relationship between these two 
functions would potentially benefit both bank shareholders and general the public to 
the extent that it reduces the probability of loss arising from regulatory action.
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